Mainly on the basis of the eEurope+surveys the variety of Information Society developments paths in Central European countries is analysed, focusing on ICT infrastructure, Internet usage, e-commerce and digital divides. Despite the big progress made by the Central European countries since transition began, most of these countries lag behind the EU-15 average on most Information Society indicators. The variety within Central Europe is enormous, with Slovenia and Estonia close to main-stream Europe and, on the other hand, Bulgaria, Romania and Hungary (...) lagging far behind. In most surveyed countries fixed telephone line penetration is stagnating or declining on a rather low level, putting a break on IS development. This makes alternative access devices to Internet, such as cable TV modem, even more important. (shrink)

I defend two main theses. First, I argue that Aristotle’s account of voluntary action focuses on the conditions under which one is the cause of one’s actions in virtue of being (qua) the individual one is. Aristotle contrasts voluntary action not only with involuntary action but also with cases in which one acts (or does something) due to one’s nature (for example, in virtue of being a member of a certain species) rather than due to one’s own desires (i.e. qua (...) individual). An action can be attributed to one qua individual in two distinct ways depending on whether one is a rational or a non-rational animal. One is responsible for one’s action in both cases, but only in the former case is one also responsible for being the sort of individual that performs it. Aristotle also distinguishes two ways in which an action can be compelled while still being an action of the agent. In the first case, one is compelled by (physically) external forces or circumstances to act against one’s internal impulse. In the second case, one is compelled to act on (internal) impulses that are fixed by one’s nature against one’s own individual impulse. This latter kind of compelled action is only possible in the case of rational agents. Secondly, I argue that Aristotle’s conception of what it is to be a cause of an action inevitably brings in certain normative features which support evaluative judgments and the practice of praise and blame. On Aristotle’s view, any goal-directed behavior that is properly attributable to an individual is (normally) subject to standards that pertain to behavior of that sort. At the most basic level, these standards establish what counts as a successful realization of the goal that one aims at. Thus even in the case of non-rational animals (or children), one can judge the success of what they are doing and encourage (or discourage) similar behavior by praise or blame. These standards are applicable to one’s conduct simply insofar as one is the controlling origin (or efficient cause) of one’s action qua individual. In the case of rational agents the practice of praise and blame can involve a further normative layer since they can be praised or blamed not only for acting in a certain way so as to encourage or discourage them with a view to the future, but also for being – and having become – individuals of a certain sort. Nevertheless, the applicability of such evaluative judgments and of praise and blame is still warranted by one’s being the controlling origin of one’s actions qua the individual one is (in this case, qua rational individual). (shrink)

W niniejszym artykule rozważam możliwość orzekania prawdy i fałszu o wytworach aktywności artystycznej człowieka, czyli dziełach sztuki. Rozważania te zawierają trzy ograniczenia: w polu moich zainteresowań pozostają przede wszystkim literackie dzieła sztuki; chodzi mi przede wszystkim o czysto poznawczy sens prawdy i fałszu, w szczególności, możliwość aplikacji tzw. klasycznej definicji prawdy; za podstawę swoich rozważań biorę przede wszystkim ustalenia wypływające z rozważań fenomenologów, w szczególności: W. Stróżewskiego, R. Ingardena, M. Heideggera i E. Husserla. Ustalenia te pozwalają mi ostatecznie przyjąć, iż (...) dzieła sztuki nie mogą być wprawdzie nosicielami prawdy klasycznie pojętej, ale są i mogą być siedliskiem „prawdy jako manifestacji”. (shrink)

We report the identification of a recurrent, 520-kb 16p12.1 microdeletion associated with childhood developmental delay. The microdeletion was detected in 20 of 11,873 cases compared with 2 of 8,540 controls and replicated in a second series of 22 of 9,254 cases compared with 6 of 6,299 controls. Most deletions were inherited, with carrier parents likely to manifest neuropsychiatric phenotypes compared to non-carrier parents. Probands were more likely to carry an additional large copy-number variant when compared to matched controls. The clinical (...) features of individuals with two mutations were distinct from and/or more severe than those of individuals carrying only the co-occurring mutation. Our data support a two-hit model in which the 16p12.1 microdeletion both predisposes to neuropsychiatric phenotypes as a single event and exacerbates neurodevelopmental phenotypes in association with other large deletions or duplications. Analysis of other microdeletions with variable expressivity indicates that this two-hit model might be more generally applicable to neuropsychiatric disease. © 2010 Nature America, Inc. All rights reserved. (shrink)

I argue for a standpoint that—against various kinds of naturalism—epistemology is a complete philosophical science. Epistemology is theoretically and methodologically self-sufficient. It has its good described subject, its characteristic research methods and its exactly described goal. The subject of epistemology is broadly comprehended cognition (knowledge)—cognition (knowledge) is comprehended as action as well as result. Among various methods peculiar to philosophy it is necessary to distinguish first of all phenomenological, transcendental and analytical methods. However, the main goal of epistemology has been (...) and still is a solution of the objective cognition issue—the problem of cognition adequacy and of its transcendence. Epistemology can achieve this goal only when: (1) it resists the temptation of its subject naturalization; (2) against the propositional theory of truth it operates a broad concept of cognition; (3) against manykinds of representationism (mediatism) it does not resign from the concept of direct cognition, i.e. view of presentationism. Thanks to reference to source cognitions and direct knowledge the realistic world view is also defendable. (shrink)

I argue for a standpoint that—against various kinds of naturalism—epistemology is a complete philosophical science. Epistemology is theoretically and methodologically self-sufficient. It has its good described subject, its characteristic research methods and its exactly described goal. The subject of epistemology is broadly comprehended cognition (knowledge)—cognition (knowledge) is comprehended as action as well as result. Among various methods peculiar to philosophy it is necessary to distinguish first of all phenomenological, transcendental and analytical methods. However, the main goal of epistemology has been (...) and still is a solution of the objective cognition issue—the problem of cognition adequacy and of its transcendence. Epistemology can achieve this goal only when: (1) it resists the temptation of its subject naturalization; (2) against the propositional theory of truth it operates a broad concept of cognition; (3) against manykinds of representationism (mediatism) it does not resign from the concept of direct cognition, i.e. view of presentationism. Thanks to reference to source cognitions and direct knowledge the realistic world view is also defendable. (shrink)

The great vision of logical empiricism brought up a hope for ultimate solving the problem of understanding our knowledge. Starting, for the first time in the history of empiricism, from a point of view typical for mathematicians not empiricists, i.e. from the program of logicism, the philosophers of Vienna Circle aimed at creating a consistent philosophy which makes possible both mathematics and empirical knowledge. Today, after more than a half century, their efforts seem to be completely futile. The topic of (...) the paper is to find out the reasons why the program failed. It seems that the deepest reason for the failure lies in the philosophy of mathematics adopted by logical empiricists - namely logicism. The main problem of the contemporary methodology is to find a remedy for this ilness. the paper suggests some ideas in this direction. One of them is more serious approach to the philosophy of mathematics. Another is the recognition of the crucial role epistemic and other values play in scientific research. (shrink)

In the first part of the paper the authors describe Hrušovský’s model of the development of scientific knowledge, which, due to the influence of logical empiricism, he saw as cumulative, hypothetical-confirmationist and internalistic, i.e. taking into account only scientific factors. In the second part it is showed, that Hrušovský acknowledged the influence of the external factors, emphasizing at the same time the fundamental independence of scientific knowledge. He dismissed the vulgar eco nomism as well as the extreme internalism.

In his Logic of Religion (1965) Bocheński presumed that: (1) ‘religion’ denotes a system of propositions of religious contents, (2) man becomes an advocate of a certain religion through an acceptance of its meta-dogma, i.e. a statement that the creed of this religion is true. In his article Religious Hypothesis Revised [in: P. Weingartner (ed.), Scientific and Religious Belief, Dordrecht 1994, 142-160] Bocheński writes that the concept of religion assumed in the Logic is wrong. Our experience shows that the conversion (...) of a man who previously was an unbeliever may occur in two steps: first, he accepts several elementary propositions about God. They constitute ‘basic faith’ (that God exists that He governs the events in the world, etc.). Then we have a collection of propositions that compose “the confession of faith” of a given religion. The religious hypothesis is applied, above all, when we accept a system. It is doubtful whether it can be used in the basic faith. In this paper, the author discusses first various forms of religious experience that inspires the basic faith: (1) a religious interpretation of secular phenomena; (2) an experience of sacrum in the world; (3) an ‘encounter’ of Transcendence. Then he presents a new version of this hypothesis: what kind of experience that some persons have accounts for religion and whether it permits to predict their new experiences or even new events. (shrink)

Belief is a mental state, its content being the statement of a certain state of affairs. With respect to the manner they arise, we divide beliefs into spontaneous and reflexive. When we take into consideration their bases, we speak about basic beliefs and beliefs derived from others. The terms “spontaneous belief” and “basic belief” have various meanings, but they are equivalent with regard to their range. Contemporary religious spontaneous and basic beliefs have various forms. In the Christian religion we speak, (...) among other things, about numinous beliefs, as described by R. Otto, and A. Plantinga’s properly basic beliefs. According to Otto, numinous experiences (of that which is tremendum et fascinans) are a source of firm beliefs for man, i.e. he has had contacts with some objective manifestations of divinity. Plantinga (whose thinking belongs to a more “naturalistic” strain) writes about properly basic beliefs, such that arise spontaneously in man (if he is not depraved by sinful life) who remains under respective circumstances. Such beliefs are the grounds for theistic derivative beliefs. The arguments for the truthfulness of the beliefs of the first and second type bring forth a series of questions, and they are constantly discussed by philosophers of religion. (shrink)

In this article the most important theistic arguments formulated by virtue of the achievements of contemporary cosmology are presented and critically discussed. In general, these are the so-called aposterioric arguments, i.e. those that descend from commonly accepted scientific facts in cosmology. In view of these facts an attempt is made to show that a theistic explanation is the best one among all the possible ones. Taking into consideration the fundamental essence of cosmological data, two the most important genera of formulated (...) arguments are pointed out. The first one refers to the Big Bang widely affirmed in cosmology. It assumes the shape of the previous argument from the beginning of the time of the Universe. The main difficulty of this argument is the fact of its groundless attribute of the Big Bang with the character of the absolute beginning of time forewent only by nothingness. The second genera of the argumentation refers to the so-called cosmic coincidences affirmed in cosmology. Depending on philosophical interpretations of these coincidences, one may speak about the argumentation from the plan, rationality, mathematicality, teleology, subtlety or con­tingency of the Universe. The cognitive value of these arguments on the one hand depends on the legitimacy of the interpretations of cosmic coincidences and on the other hand it depends on the possibility of demonstrating that the theistic interpretation of philosophically interpreted scientific facts is the best possible explanation. Because there is no easy way to demonstrate the validity and correctness of both ways of ratiocination, therefore the evidential strength of all these arguments evokes many questions. (shrink)

The paper is a discussion of tragedy as an analogy to the tragism of life which has its roots in the conflicts between individual freedom and power, love and hatred. Further, it examines the constructive and destructive elements of tragedy, i.e. love and hatred, as well as the roles the law, necessity and the sublime play in tragedy. It also outlines the interconnection and mutual interdependence of freedom, necessity, immortality and the sublime It also shows, how the crisis is transformed (...) in the art of tragedy. (shrink)

The paper offers the first and the most comprehensive outline of perichronosophy, i.e. a theory of timelessness and its practicing, which are to be taken as a theoretical(perichronology) and practical (atemporalistics) grounds of syncriticism. The fundamental concept of perichronosophy is perichrony expressed by the term perichronosopheme. This concept has been articulated in recent years by applying the syncritic method in the examination of various pre-temporal, intratemporal, and beyond-temporal units of timelessness, as well as their various timeless qualities, linkages and processes (...) taking place in various spheres of timelessness: in pretemporality, intra-temporality as well as between time and timelessness. Perichronosophy goes back mainly to Plato’s theory of timelessness oscillating around the notions of exaiphnes and metaxy. (shrink)

The paper summarizes the results achieved up to now in developing syncriticism as a philosophical-methodological approach and a way of life. The author focuses on the practical aspect of syncriticism, i.e. on atemporalistics, which represents the art of eliminating time from the individual’s life: replacing temporally achieving an objective by a timeless being in it. Included are also practical examples of training the ability to annihilate the vacuoles in our lives.

Along with the development of humanistic branches of psychology, ethnography, and social sciences one may observe a gradual increase of factual statements concerning moral phenomena, i.e., those forms of relations of particular men among themselves which are connected with such concepts as justice, injury, goodness, evilness, etc. Under the influence of the crisis of systematical philosophy and evolutionism, as well as in connection with the development of those sciences which – according to their programs or accidentally – have dealt with (...) moral phenomena has gradually arisen the problem of ethics, as a normative science, with the other sciences mentioned above. Some light-minded critics of ethics were of the opinion that the place of ethics should be taken by a general science of morality which would be methodologically related mainly to psychology, sociology and history of culture. (shrink)

In relation to material reality only direct perception as sensual perception gives unbiased, reliable cognisance. Therefore, this cognisance is irremovably receptive. A subject does not add anything of himself to the object. Thinking does not play any role in such a cognisance, because object is before any thinking. According to Jacobi sensual cognisance consists of this what is given, a certain perceived content, and of a feeling assuring the existence of what is given, e.g. a belief. These two elements are (...) inseparable. A foundation of this approach has been prepared for Jacobi by Thomas Reid, however, it was finalised thanks to critical reference to David Hume concerning that second, not perceptive element of cognisance. (shrink)

In cases where one sense-modality is stimulated by another, we speak of synesthesia, i.e., of a subjective experience of multiple distinct sensations as being quite literally conjoined. The term “synesthesia” is derived indirectly from the Greek words “syn,” meaning “together,” and “aisthesis,” meaning “sensation.” This article focuses on the question of whether synesthesia is in fact a mental disorder or a creative gift. Both the commonsense views that have emerged in recent times, and neurological research, demonstrate that our knowledge of (...) this relatively uncommon phenomenon is slowly but constantly expanding. Proper experimental research conducted with the right sorts of synesthete, and philosophically and scientifically nuanced conceptual studies of synesthesia, can all be helpful when seeking answers to the question posed above, while also confirming general claims about the extent to which our perceptions are reallysubjective. Most synesthetes see themselves as gifted, and claim that this “conjoining of the senses” enriches the quality of their lives. (shrink)

In cases where one sense-modality is stimulated by another, we speak of synesthesia, i.e., of a subjective experience of multiple distinct sensations as being quite literally conjoined. The term “synesthesia” is derived indirectly from the Greek words “syn,” meaning “together,” and “aisthesis,” meaning “sensation.” This article focuses on the question of whether synesthesia is in fact a mental disorder or a creative gift. Both the commonsense views that have emerged in recent times, and neurological research, demonstrate that our knowledge of (...) this relatively uncommon phenomenon is slowly but constantly expanding. Proper experimental research conducted with the right sorts of synesthete, and philosophically and scientifically nuanced conceptual studies of synesthesia, can all be helpful when seeking answers to the question posed above, while also confirming general claims about the extent to which our perceptions are really subjective. Most synesthetes see themselves as gifted, and claim that this “conjoining of the senses” enriches the quality of their lives. (shrink)

The text below should not be treated as a direct source of knowledge on the dynamic of philosophical ideas and attitudes of Leszek Kołakowski, but as an attempt at placing his thinking on the map of the 20th century universalistic thought, i.e. that which is the closest to the editors of Dialogue and Universalism. The starting point of the picture is the category of inorganic body from Marx’s Manuscripts and Two Sources... by Bergson, which enables a non-naturalistic description of the (...) metaphysical perspective of both these activistic anthropologies, speaking of the evolution of mankind in the vein of Hegelian Spirit causality.Another system of reference is A. Badiou’s universalistic but irreligious interpretation of St. Paul’s ideas. Both of these set out an activistic perspective which is confronted with a solely contemplative vision of mysticism, as expressed by Leszek Kołakowski, and a modern concept of belief in what surpasses but does not enslave, which Kołakowski shared with Jaspers and Paul Ricoeur.Against such a notional grid the author seeks to render the peculiar quality of Kołakowski’s pulsating and greatly dialectical metaphysical position, associated with a skeptical attitude of a rationalist in the face of the phenomenon of the world’s indifference that he experiences and within the framework of the continued existential note of the non-atheistic existentialism of Kierkegaard, Jaspers and Pascal in its combination with St. Augustine’s concept of evil, read in the context of Auschwitz and Kolyma. Taken together these ideas sort of form an instrument to express mythical questions about the sense of life and history. (shrink)

The text below should not be treated as a direct source of knowledge on the dynamic of philosophical ideas and attitudes of Leszek Kołakowski, but as an attempt at placing his thinking on the map of the 20th century universalistic thought, i.e. that which is the closest to the editors of Dialogue and Universalism. The starting point of the picture is the category of inorganic body from Marx’s Manuscripts and Two Sources... by Bergson, which enables a non-naturalistic description of the (...) metaphysical perspective of both these activistic anthropologies, speaking of the evolution of mankind in the vein of Hegelian Spirit causality.Another system of reference is A. Badiou’s universalistic but irreligious interpretation of St. Paul’s ideas. Both of these set out an activistic perspective which is confronted with a solely contemplative vision of mysticism, as expressed by Leszek Kołakowski, and a modern concept of belief in what surpasses but does not enslave, which Kołakowski shared with Jaspers and Paul Ricoeur.Against such a notional grid the author seeks to render the peculiar quality of Kołakowski’s pulsating and greatly dialectical metaphysical position, associated with a skeptical attitude of a rationalist in the face of the phenomenon of the world’s indifference that he experiences and within the framework of the continued existential note of the non-atheistic existentialism of Kierkegaard, Jaspers and Pascal in its combination with St. Augustine’s concept of evil, read in the context of Auschwitz and Kolyma. Taken together these ideas sort of form an instrument to express mythical questions about the sense of life and history. (shrink)

The paper is aimed at defining reduction, oxidation, and redox reactions based both on the oxidation number and charge changes in reacting species. It is rationalized that the processes of oxidation and reduction, usually occurring simultaneously, can occur also as independent processes. It is explained that in balancing chemical equations of redox reactions the “gain” or “loss” of electrons should be understood as changes in oxidation number. A formal expressions “+n e−” and “−n e−” represent in reality a decrease and (...) increase in oxidation number by n units, respectively. (shrink)

The paper is aimed at the issues of oxidation state determination and limiting values. The possibility of existence of compounds containing an atom with the oxidation number beyond the current common values, i.e., below −IV and above +VIII are discussed. Three principal modes of preparation of compounds with the oxidation number exceeding VIII, electrochemical anodic oxidation, photoionization, and nuclear β-decay, are evaluated. Failure to prepare compounds containing an atom with the oxidation number below −IV is rationalized. The paper provides an (...) opinion on uncertainties in oxidation state determination in three kinds of compounds: binary compounds, nitrosyl complexes, and compounds containing mutually bonded atoms of the same element. The questions are discussed from the viewpoint of correlation of “man-made” quantities and objective, experimentally obtainable data. (shrink)

Author: Herbut Józef Title: DIRECTIONS AND PROBLEMS IN THE PHILOSOPHY OF RELIGION (Filozofia religii: jej problematyka i jej odmiany) Source: Filo-Sofija year: 2011, vol:.15, number: 2011/4, pages: 911-917 Keywords: PHILOSOPHY OF RELIGION, ANALYTIC PHILOSOPHY OF RELIGION, PHENOMENOLOGY OF RELIGION, DEFINITION OF RELIGION, RELIGIOUS BELIEFS, RELIGIOUS LANGUAGE Discipline: PHILOSOPHY Language: POLISH Document type: ARTICLE Publication order reference (Primary author’s office address): E-mail: www:The main task of the philosophy of religion is to adequately define the concept of religion – it should (...) be comprehensive enough to cover all historically known forms of religion and restrictive enough to exclude any other cultural forms which are only similar to religion. How we understand the nature of religious beliefs (their propositional, volitional and emotional content) determines the method of philosophizing about religion. The religious doctrine plays a decisive role in religion, in one way or another motivating and justifying moral norms and worship practices. Traditionally oriented philosophers of religion have been chiefly interested in reasons for accepting a religious doctrine and in metaphysical problems; analytical philosophy of religion has brought into focus the semiotics of religious propositions. (shrink)

ROBERT SPAEMANN’S NEW APPROACH TO THE CLASSICAL THEORY OF THE PERSON The article is concerned with the subject of the person, which constitutes the core of anthropological reflections of the eminent German thinker, Robert Spaemann. The issue of the person was especially noticeable in one of his most important works entitled Personen. This issue generated a keen interest and recognition of specialists in many countries. These reflections are based on the metaphysical concept of human existence. That is why Spaemann’s theory (...) of the person is often defined as metaphysics of the person. First, in the introduction, the author points to the significance of the issue; second, he describes its most important threads: understanding the person, the person’s identity and traits such as rationality, freedom, intentionality, love, religiousness, transcendence, ability to forgive, to keep one’s promise and to speak. The next part of the article presents the issues of the person’s self-fulfilment, indestructibility, being the subject of law, having a special status, i.e. dignity. Readers also learn why the classical vision of the person (Boethius, Thomas Aquinas, Kant) is not outdated, whereas Locke’s theory (as well as its radicalised version propagated by its well-known supporters, Parfit, Hoerster, Singer) remains unacceptable as contradictory in itself. As has been emphasized, it involves some false anthropological assumptions, e.g. the issue of the so-called potential person and the difference between human life and person’s life. However, the latter theory is increasingly popular at present since it supports, among others, the justifiability of abortion and euthanasia, and it suits the contemporary mentality with a definitely hedonist overtone. Many of Spaemann’s views on the person are truly significant and innovative. The issue that Spaemann himself regards as particularly important is his response to the false ideas of Locke and his contemporary continuators. The eminent scholar not only reveals the logical incoherence of this thought and its deviation from common sense, but using unique linguistic and transcendental-pragmatic argumentation, he proves that human is a person, i.e. “someone”, since the moment of conception. Thus, we cannot be thought of as if we had been “something” at first. That is why, not accidentally, the subtitle of Spaemann’s most important book on anthropology, i.e. Personen, is The difference between “someone” and “something”. In this response to Locke’s false theory (and its supporters), he explains that one cannot talk about such a distinction in the case of human beings. The second innovative issue in Spaemann’s work is the defence of the classical concept of the person and expressing it in a new way. The third one is his attempt at overcoming both spiritualistic and naturalistic perception of the human being. The fourth is Spaeman’s observation that our ability to forgive and to keep promises should be treated as a significant trait of the person. The article presents also some aspects of Spaemann’s vision of the person which have not been the subject of analyses yet, neither in the Polish nor in the Western literature, e.g. characteristics of the person, the person being the subject of laws and the person’s special status (ontological and moral dignity). Keywords: ROBERT SPAEMANN, THEORY OF THE PERSON, ONTOLOGICAL DIGNITY, MORAL DIGNITY. (shrink)

The presented paper focuses on the analysis of strategic documents at the level of the European Union concerning the regulation of artificial intelligence as one of the so-called disruptive technologies. In the first part of the article, we outline the basic terminology. Subsequently, we focus on the summarizing and systemizing of the key documents adopted at the EU level in terms of artificial intelligence regulation. The focus of the paper is devoted to issues of personal data protection and cyber security (...) included in these strategic documents. The final part contains recommendations for future research and evaluation of its key features. (shrink)